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Operation Rewarding Sacrifice: A Proposal
to Amend the Definition of "Veteran" in
Title 5 to Fully Effectuate the Purposes of
Veterans' Preference
Brian Torresi*
Veterans 'preference is but a partial recognition of the great
debt of gratitude that the country owes to those who have served
in the Armed Forces.'
-President Ronald Reagan
I. Introduction
The armed forces of the United States consist of approximately
2
1,398,833 total active duty servicemen and servicewomen. Since
October 31, 1992, the total active duty force size of the military has
decreased by almost 400,000 troops. 3 As a result of the decrease in
military strength, National Guard and Reserve members have been called
to active duty at increased rates in support of current worldwide
4operations .
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2006; B.S. Iowa State University, 2003. The author served on active duty in
the United States Air Force and was a legal intern at the Pennsylvania State Civil Service
Commission. The author would like to thank his wife, Cherie, his children, Gabriella and
Jacob, and the rest of his family and friends for all of their love and support. The author
would also like to thank all of the men and women who have served in the armed forces
of the United States for all of their sacrifices and dedication.
1. Proclamation No. 5217, 49 Fed. Reg. 27,919 (July 5, 1984) (declaring June 1984
Veterans' Preference Month); see also S.J. Res. 297, 98th Cong., 98 Stat. 281 (1984).
2. Department of Defense, Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade (Mar.
31, 2005), http://webl.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/rg0503.pdf (last visited July 27, 2005).
3. Department of Defense, Total Active Duty Military Personnel by Service, Fiscal
Year 1993, http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/mOl/sms2lr93.htm (last visited July 27,
2005).
4. David Moniz, Guard, Reserves to be 37% of U.S. Force in Iraq in '04; it's
Largest Combat Mission for Part-time Troops in 30 Years, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2003, at
1, 2003 WLNR 6079632. As of May 11, 2005, the Army National Guard and Army
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Rewarding the sacrifices of veterans under the concept of "service
earned through service" has been a fundamental principle throughout the
history of the United States.5 Providing veterans with preferential
treatment for government jobs as a reward for such sacrifice and service
dates back to the Revolutionary War period.6 This preferential treatment,
otherwise known as veterans' preference, has changed throughout the
years, with the last major piece of federal legislation concerning
veterans' preference being the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 ("the
Veterans' Preference Act").7 The structure of our armed forces and the
way war is fought and will be fought in the twenty-first century has
changed significantly over the years and will likely continue to change.
In light of these changes, and in order to effectuate the traditional and
historic purposes of veterans' preference laws generally, the current law
must be amended.
The purpose of this Comment is to provide an overview of the
preference that veterans receive in regard to civil service employment
with the federal government and to propose changes to current veterans'
preference law. Specifically, this Comment will propose that the federal
government should change the definition of "veteran" in Title 5 of the
United States Code8 to Pennsylvania's recently amended definition of
"soldier" in the Pennsylvania Military and Veterans Code.9 Adopting
Pennsylvania's definition of "soldier" would further the traditional and
historic purposes of veterans' preference laws in light of modem
worldwide military operations.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of veterans' preference
Reserve have mobilized 149,581 troops, the Navy Reserve has mobilized 3,653 troops,
the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve have mobilized 9,361 troops, the Marine
Corps Reserve has mobilized 11,299 troops, and the Coast Guard Reserve has mobilized
581 troops. Department of Defense, National Guard and Reserve Units Called to Active
Duty (May 11, 2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2005/d2005051 lngr.pdf
(last visited July 27, 2005).
5. Office of Facilities Management, A Brief History of the VA,
http://www.va.gov/facmgt/historic/Brief VAHistory.asp (last visited July 27, 2005)
[hereinafter VA History]. Providing assistance to veterans can be traced back to 1636
when the Pilgrims of Plymouth Colony were at war with the Pequot Indians. The
Pilgrims felt that the entire colony should be responsible for supporting soldiers who
became disabled from the conflict. Id. A 1736 colonial law read, "If any man shall be
sent forth as a soldier and shall return maimed, he shall be maintained competently by the
colony during his life." Id.
6. See generally Office of Personnel Management, VetGuide (Apr. 2003),
http://www.opm.gov/veterans/ref.asp (last visited July 27, 2005) [hereinafter VetGuide].
7. Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-359, 58 Stat. 387 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Veterans'Preference Act].
8. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1) (2000).




for civil service employment with the federal government. Part III
discusses the current definition of "veteran" in Title 5 and explains how
this definition is an obstacle to the full effectuation of the purposes of
veterans' preference. Part IV compares the preference afforded to
veterans by the federal government with the preference provided by
Pennsylvania and explains why Pennsylvania's definition of "soldier" is
the proper means to the end of rewarding former members of the armed
forces for their sacrifices. Finally, Part V concludes by proposing that in
order to fully effectuate the historic purposes of veterans' preference, the
preference must be provided to all veterans, regardless of whether they
served in wartime or peacetime.
II. Background
A. The History of Veterans' Preference
Although not codified or enacted, preference for veterans in civil
service employment with the federal government dates back to the
Revolutionary War.' ° The first legislation that provided preference for
veterans was enacted in 1865 and provided that honorably discharged
veterans who were discharged as the result of a disability incurred in the
line of duty ("service-connected disability") were given preference for
appointments to civil offices." The legislation required that the veteran
possess the minimum qualifications necessary to perform the duties of
the employment position.' 2  Although this legislation provided
preference for civil service positions only to veterans who had a service-
connected disability, the legislation "respectfully recommended" to
bankers, merchants, manufacturers, mechanics, farmers, and other
business owners to prefer veterans for employment positions "in grateful
recognition of the[ir] services, sacrifices, and sufferings....
Veterans' preference laws underwent considerable changes from
this first legislation until the Veterans' Preference Act. For example, an
1876 statute applied veterans' preference to reductions in force by
requiring the heads of executive departments to retain honorably
discharged veterans over other employees when making such
10. VetGuide, supra note 6, at 58 (stating that, although used primarily for former
commissioned officers, appointments to federal jobs as a reward for serving in the
military became a popular practice during the days of the spoils system).
11. A Resolution to Encourage the Employment of Disabled and Discharged
Soldiers, Res. 27, 38th Cong., 13 Stat. 571 (1865).
12. Id. Specifically, the statute stated that the veteran must "possess the business
capacity necessary for the proper discharge of the duties of such offices." Id.
13. Id. §2.
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reductions.14 This mandatory retention also applied to the widows and
orphans of deceased veterans.1
5
Shortly thereafter, veterans were given preference in reinstatements
in addition to the appointment and retention preference.' 6  This
preference allowed honorably discharged veterans, who were also former
civil service workers, to be reinstated to civil service positions without
having to wait a certain amount of time.' 7 This preference also applied
to the widows and orphans of deceased veterans.18
In 1919, the appointment preference was amended to provide
preference for positions within the executive department and independent
governmental establishments for honorably discharged soldiers, sailors,
marines, and their widows who were qualified to hold the position for
which they were applying. 19 That same year, the preference was
extended to include the wives of disabled veterans under the condition
that the wives themselves be qualified for the position.2 °
The 1919 appointment legislation was significant for a few reasons.
Most importantly, unlike prior legislation .concerning appointments, this
legislation made no reference to whether a veteran's service had to be
during a time of war.21 This legislation was also the first to make no
distinction between disabled and non-disabled veterans and was the first
legislation that gave an appointment preference to spouses of veterans.22
In addition to being afforded preference in appointments, all
veterans were given additional points on their civil service examination
scores. 23  Disabled veterans were given additional points on their
examinations and an "absolute preference" after the examinations were
scored.24
14. 19 Stat. 143, 169 (1876).
15. Id.
16. VetGuide, supra note 6, at 59.
17. Id.
18. Id. (stating that the reinstatement preference was extended to the widows and
orphans of veterans in 1892).
19. 40 Stat. 1291, 1293 (1919).
20. VetGuide, supra note 6, at 59-60.
21. Compare 40 Stat. 1291, 1293, with 13 Stat. 571.
22. VetGuide, supra note 6, at 60. The original 1865 appointment legislation gave
preference to "persons honorably discharged.., by reason of disability.. . incurred in
the line of duty." 13 Stat. 571. The subsequent legislations that afforded preference in
reductions in force and reinstatements made no distinction between disabled and non-
disabled veterans. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
23. VetGuide, supra note 6, at 60 (stating that ten points were added to the
examination scores of disabled veterans and five points were added to the examination
scores of non-disabled veterans).
24. Id. at 59-60 (stating that "absolute preference" meant that disabled veterans
could pass civil service examinations with a score of sixty-five instead of needing a score
of seventy, which non-veterans needed to score in order to pass and that these veterans
[Vol. I110: 1
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B. The Veterans' Preference Act of 1944
The Veterans' Preference Act, which consolidated the previous and
then existing veterans' preference laws, was intended to strengthen and
give legislative sanction to such laws.25 The Veterans' Preference Act
provided preference for four categories of veterans and their family
members ("preference eligibles"). The first category of preference
eligibles consisted of honorably discharged veterans who served on
active duty in any branch of the armed forces and who either had a
service-connected disability or who were receiving compensation,
pension, or disability retirement benefits from the Veterans
Administration, War Department, or Navy Department.26 The second
category of preference eligibles consisted of the wives of veterans who
had a service-connected disability, but only if the disabled veteran could
not himself qualify for the civil service position.27
The third category of preference eligibles consisted of the
unmarried widows of honorably discharged deceased veterans if the
veteran served on active duty in any branch of the armed forces during
any war or in any campaign or expedition for which a campaign medal
was authorized.28 The final category of preference eligibles consisted of
honorably discharged veterans who served on active duty in any branch
of the armed forces during any war or in any campaign or expedition for
which a campaign medal was authorized. 9
Preference for the categories of persons enumerated in the Veterans'
Preference Act was to be applied in appointments, reinstatements,
reemployments, and retentions.30 The preferences applied to all positions
in the federal government, regardless of whether the position was
temporary or permanent or whether the position was a classified or
would be placed at the top of employment lists).
25. Brannan v. Elder, 341 U.S. 277, 284 (1951); Proclamation No. 5217, 49 Fed.
Reg. 27,919 (July 5, 1984) (stating that the Veterans Preference Act "brought together,
for the first time, laws, Executive orders, and regulations extending back to the Civil War
which granted preference in Federal employment to veterans").
26. Veterans' Preference Act, supra note 7, § 2. The Veterans Administration, now
known as the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, is one of the largest federal
agencies, second only to the Department of Defense. VA History, supra note 5. The
department was created in 1930 to coordinate governmental activities that affect war
veterans and was made a cabinet level department in 1988. Id.; Department of Veterans
Affairs Act, Pub. L. No. 100-527, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988). When speaking of the newly
created cabinet level department, President George H. Bush exclaimed, "There is only
one place for the veterans of America... at the table with the President of the United
States of America." VA History, supra note 5.
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unclassified civil service position.
3
1
The Veterans' Preference Act incorporated and extended the
practice of adding points to civil service examination scores by providing
persons in the first three categories with an additional ten points and the
persons in category four with an additional five points.32  Also
incorporated within the Veterans' Preference Act was the absolute
preference that placed preference eligibles who received a ten point score
augmentation on the top of employment lists. 33 Preference eligibles who
received an additional five points were to be placed ahead of all other
applicants with similar scores on examinations.
34
Besides incorporating the addition of points to examination scores
and the higher placement on employment lists, the Veterans' Preference
Act added benefits that had not previously been afforded.35 Agencies
were now required to appoint one of the top three applicants on an
employment list ("the Rule of Three").36 If a preference eligible veteran
was one of the top three candidates for a position and the agency decided
to pass over that veteran to hire a non-veteran who did not receive
preference, the agency had to file a written explanation of the decision
with the Civil Service Commission.37 Essentially, this meant that if a
veteran was one of the top three candidates on an employment list, the
agency was forced to hire that veteran unless it had a sufficient reason
not to hire the veteran.
38
The Veterans' Preference Act also provided that governmental
agencies were required to credit a veterans' time in the military as actual
time in employment.39 Military service time was credited if the veterans'
31. Id. The Veterans' Preference Act provided that the "positions of guards, elevator
operators, messengers, and custodians... shall be restricted to persons entitled to
preference .. ." Id. § 3.
32. Veterans' Preference Act, supra note 7, § 3; see also supra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text.
33. Veterans' Preference Act, supra note 7, § 7. This "absolute preference" was
discontinued when veterans first began receiving additional points in 1923 and
subsequently restored in 1929 for veterans who had a service-connected disability.
VetGuide, supra note 6, at 60; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
34. Veterans'Preference Act, supra note 7, § 7.
35. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
36. Veterans'Preference Act, supra note 7, § 8.
37. Id. The Civil Service Commission was renamed the Office of Personnel
Management in 1978. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat.
1111 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). The Office of Personnel Management
was created to implement and oversee an honest, competent, and productive federal
workforce free from prohibited personnel actions and consistent with merit principles.
Id.
38. Veterans' Preference Act, supra note 7, § 8 (stating that "the Civil Service
Commission is directed to determine the sufficiency of such submitted reasons").
39. Id. § 4.
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employment was interrupted by military service, the position the veteran
was applying for was of a similar vocation, and experience was a
necessary requirement for the position.40 For every other position, all of
a veteran's "valuable experience" had to be credited and applied to meet
job-related qualifications.4' In addition, agencies were required to waive
age, height, and weight requirements for veteran applicants unless such
requirements were essential to perform the functions of the employment
position.42
While the Veterans Preference Act was intended to extend and give
force to existing veterans' preference laws, 43 it actually limited the
number of "veterans" who could receive preference. In order to receive
preference, a veteran had to have had a service-connected disability, had
to have served on active duty during a war, or had to have served in a
campaign or expedition for which a campaign medal was authorized. a
This shift back to requiring wartime service was in contrast with the
1919 appointment legislation that afforded the preference to all
servicemen and servicewomen without regard to whether their service
was during wartime or peacetime.4 5
III. Title 5: You're A Veteran, But Are You A "Veteran"?
A. The Definition of "Veteran" in Title 5
Current veterans' preference legislation takes the form of numerous
scattered sections throughout Title 5 of the United States Code. 6 To
receive preference, a person must be a "preference eligible. ''47 Included
40. Id.
41. Id. (stating that some examples of "valuable experience" include "experience
gained in religious, civic, welfare, service, and organizational activities, regardless of
whether any compensation was received therefore").
42. Id. § 5.
43. Brannan v. Elder, 341 U.S. 277, 284 (1951); see also supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
44. Veterans' Preference Act, supra note 7, § 2; see also supra notes 26-29 and
accompanying text. The implication of distinguishing between veterans who served
during a war and veterans who served during peacetime may not have been evident when
the Veterans' Preference Act was enacted because it was enacted towards the end of
World War II, thus making every military member at the time of enactment a "veteran"
by virtue of serving during a war. VetGuide, supra note 6, at 41 (stating that the inclusive
dates for World War II are from December 7, 1941, to April 28, 1952).
45. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
46. The Veterans' Preference Act, as amended, was originally codified in 5 U.S.C.
§§ 851-69, and is now scattered throughout Title 5 as 5 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 2108, 3305,
3308-18, 3320, 3351, 3363, 3501-04, 7512, 7701.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (2000).
2005]
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48within the definition of "preference eligible" are disabled veterans,
certain family members of disabled veterans, 49 former military members
whose service meets the stringent criteria of who is defined as a
"veteran," 50 and certain family members of those who are considered
"veterans.",51 Any former military member whose service does not fit
within either the definition of "veteran" or "disabled veteran" is not
eligible for preference.52
Although the veterans' preference legislation is no longer codified
seriatim,53 the legislation has maintained most of the benefits afforded by
the Veterans' Preference Act.54 Such benefits include preference in the
form of additional points being added to passing civil service
examination scores, 55  preference in appointments,
56  transfers, 57
promotions, 58 retentions, 59 reinstatements, 60 and higher placement on
48. Id. § 2108(3)(C). The term "disabled veteran" is defined as
"an individual who has served on active duty in the armed forces, has
been separated therefrom under honorable conditions, and has
established the present existence of a service-connected disability or is
receiving compensation, disability retirement benefits, or pension
because of a public statute administered by the Department of
Veterans Affairs or a military department."
Id. § 2108(2).
49. Id. §§ 2108(3)(E), (G).
50. Id. §§ 2108(3)(A)-(B).
51. Id. §§ 2108(3)(D), (F).
52. See, e.g., Perez v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 85 F.3d 591, 594 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that former military member whose service did not fall within the ambit of the
definition of "veteran" in 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1), is not a "preference eligible" under 5
U.S.C. § 2108(3)).
53. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
55. 5 U.S.C. § 3309 (2000) (adding ten points to the passing examination score of a
preference eligible as defined in sections 2108(3)(C)-(G) and five points to the passing
examination score of a preference eligible as defined in sections 2108(3)(A)-(B)).
56. Id. §§ 3311-12 (crediting experience interrupted by military service and
experience material to the functions of the applied for position and waiving age, height,
weight, and other physical requirements for preference eligibles that are not essential for
the performance of the duties of the position being appointed or reinstated to).
57. Id. § 3351 (waiving age, height, weight, and other physical requirements for
preference eligibles that are not essential for the performance of the duties of the position
being transferred to).
58. Id. § 3363 (waiving age, height, weight, and other physical requirements for
preference eligibles that are not essential for the performance of the duties of the position
being promoted to).
59. Id. §§ 3502, 3504 (placing preference eligibles above other employees in
determining order of retention during reductions in force and waiving age, height, weight,
and other physical requirements for preference eligibles that are not essential for the
performance of the duties of the position being retained in).
60. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3314-16 (entitling preference eligibles who have resigned,
separated, or furloughed to have their names placed on employment lists for positions
that they may qualify to hold and providing that a preference eligible may be appointed to
[Vol. I110: 1
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employment lists of eligible candidates. 61 Although maintaining many of
the benefits afforded by the Veterans' Preference Act, the definition of
who is a "veteran," and thus who is a "preference eligible" has changed
significantly.
There are currently several different ways for a former military
member to qualify as a "veteran." Specifically, a "veteran" is one who
has served on active duty in the armed forces during a war,62 during the
period from April 28, 1952, to July 1, 1955, or in a campaign or
expedition for which a campaign medal has been authorized.63 A
"veteran" is also considered one who served on active duty64 for more
than 180 consecutive days after January 31, 1955, and before October 15,
1976,65 or who served on active duty with no time requirement during the
period from August 2, 1990, until January 2, 1992.66 All three possible
definitions of veteran are qualified in that all persons who meet the
service requirement must have been separated from the armed forces
a position for which he or she is eligible).
61. Id. § 3313 (providing that for non-scientific and non-professional positions,
veterans who receive ten points added to their passing examination score will be placed
above all others on lists of eligibles, and veterans who receive five points added to their
passing examination score will be placed ahead of all others who have the same ratings).
62. The requirement of active duty service during a "war" has always been
interpreted by the Office of Personnel Management to mean only wars declared by
Congress. VetGuide, supra note 6, at 2.
63. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(l)(A) (2000).
64. Sections 2108(1)(B) and (1)(C) require active duty service different to the
service required in § 2108(l)(A). Specifically, they qualify that the service must conform
to the definition of "active duty," as defined in Title 38, which defines "active duty" as
essentially all full-time service not incurred for training purposes only, if and only if the
service meets the other requirements enumerated in §§ 2108(l)(B) and (1)(C). 38 U.S.C.
§ 101(21) (2000).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(l)(B). Section 2108(l)(A) defines a "veteran" as anyone who
served during the period from April 28, 1952, through July 1, 1955. Id. § 2108(l)(A).
Section 2108(1)(B) requires 180 consecutive days of active duty service after January 31,
1955, and before October 15, 1976. Id. § 2108(l)(B). The two sections overlap each
other because anyone who served from January 31, 1955, through July 1, 1955, could
have qualifying service under both sections. Id. Section 2108(l)(A) would grant such
person "veteran" status, but § 2108(l)(B) would require that person to serve the 180
consecutive days of active duty. Id. How such a conflict would be resolved is unknown
and will most likely remain unknown unless a veteran who served during that time period
is now seeking civil service employment.
66. Id. § 2108(l)(C). On May 5, 2005, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006 was introduced in Congress. H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. (1st Sess.2005).
The Act proposes that the definition of "veteran" be amended to include active duty
service, other than service for training purposes only, if the service was after September
11, 2001, and prior to or on the last date of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which date has not
yet been determined. Id. at § 1108 (this new subsection, if passed, would be cited as 5
U.S.C. § 2108(l)(D)). Similar to 5 U.S.C. § 2108(l)(B), this service would only qualify
a military member as a "veteran" if the member served 180 consecutive days of active
duty during the stated time period. Id.
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under honorable conditions.67
Besides actual former military members whose service meets the
requirements of the definition of "veteran" or "disabled veteran," the
definition of "preference eligible" includes certain family members of
such veterans.68  Specifically, like the Veterans' Preference Act,
preference is given to the unmarried widows of veterans whose service
met the requirements as stated in § 2108(1)(A), 69 and the spouses of
disabled veterans if the veterans are unable to qualify for a civil service
position as the result of a disability.7°
Unlike the Veterans' Preference Act, Title 5 provides preference to
the mothers of deceased veterans whose service met the requirements as
stated in § 2108(l)(A), 71 and the mothers of disabled veterans who are
permanently and totally disabled.72
Some retired members of the armed forces who are entitled to
retirement pay may not receive preference even if their service qualifies
them as a "veteran" under Title 5.73 Such members can only receive
preference if they meet the definition of "disabled veteran" or if they
retired below the rank of Major or its branch equivalent.74
B. The Purposes of Veterans' Preference
The long history and evolution of veterans' preference law solidifies
the argument that the preference is something that Congress has thought
necessary for over 150 years.75 Veterans' preference laws have been
challenged so many times that the rationale for continuing to give
67. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1).
68. See supra notes 49, 51 and accompanying text.
69. Id. § 2108(3)(D); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
70. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3)(E); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
71. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108(3)(F)(i)-(iii) (stating that for the mother of a deceased veteran
whose service meets the requirements of § 2108(1)(A) to be considered a preference
eligible, she has to either not be currently married, or if she is currently married, her
husband must be permanently and totally disabled). The conditions of being unmarried
or being married to a totally disabled person are only applicable "when preference is
claimed." Id. Thus, the mother of a deceased veteran can claim the preference to attain
an employment position, and then get remarried with no consequences. Id.
72. Id. §§ 2108(3)(G)(i)-(iii) (stating that in order for the mother of a permanently
and totally disabled veteran to be considered a preference eligible, she must meet all of
the requirements set forth in sections 2108(3)(F)(i)-(iii), and the veteran must have a
service-connected disability); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
73. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108(4)-(5).
74. Id. § 2108(4). In the Army, Air Force, and the Marine Corps, the rank of Major
is designated as 0-4. Department of Defense, The United States Military Officer Rank
Insignia, http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/insignias/officers.html (last visited July 27,
2005). The title of the branch equivalent of the rank of Major in the Navy and the Coast
Guard is Lieutenant Commander. Id.
75. See supra notes 10-45 and accompanying text.
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preference has become standardized.7 6 In fact, veterans' preference laws
are so fundamental that they are precluded from being challenged under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 77
Hiring preference for veterans has traditionally been justified as a
78 es hireward for veterans for their sacrifice for military service, to ease their
transition from life in the military back to civilian life,79 to encourage
patriotic service s° and to attract well-disciplined people to civil service
employment.
8'
Despite these long-standing, traditional justifications, current
federal veterans' preference laws limit preference to only veterans with a
service-connected disability,82 veterans who served on active duty during
the specific dates as identified by statute,83 veterans who served during a
war,84 and veterans who served in a campaign or expedition for which a
campaign medal has been authorized. 85  Thus, current veterans'
preference law excludes from its ambit every former military member
not meeting the stringent criteria of who is a "veteran" under Title 5.
The limitations imposed by Title 5 do not coincide with the
traditional justifications for providing veterans with preference.86
Essentially, Title 5 says that only veterans whose service fits neatly into
the specified categories should be rewarded for their sacrifices, that only
veterans who meet the Title 5 definition of "veteran" need to be eased
from military life to civilian life, that only veterans who meet the Title 5
definition of "veteran" possess the discipline level sought after by civil
service organizations, and that limiting the preference to only those
veterans whose service meets the Title 5 definition of "veteran"
encourages patriotic service. The purposes of veterans' preference are
76. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 266 n.12 (1979), affd, 445 U.S.
901 (1980). In Feeney, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of a Massachusetts veterans' preference statute. Id. at 259. Although the
constitutionality attack was against a Massachusetts statute and not against federal
veterans' preference law, the Court stated that the federal government and virtually every
state gives some form of preference to veterans. Id. at 261. Thus, the Feeney
justifications are for veterans' preference in general and not Massachusetts specifically.
Id. at 261-262, 265.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 11 (2000) (stating that nothing contained in the Civil Rights
Act "shall be construed to repeal or modify any Federal, State, territorial, or local law
creating special rights or preference for veterans").




82. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(2).
83. Id. §§ 2108(i)(A)-(C).
84. Id. § 2108(l)(A).
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
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arguably not fully furthered by limiting the preference to those who are
"veterans" under Title 5.
C. Title 5: Injustice in Action
The harsh results created by the narrow definition of "veteran" are
evidenced by numerous cases involving appeals of personnel actions to
the Merit Systems Protection Board ("the Board").87 In Perez v. Merit
Systems Protection Board,88 a letter carrier who was removed89 from the
United States Postal Service appealed his removal to the Board.90 After
being removed from his position, Perez was no longer an employee, nor
was he an applicant for employment. In order to establish that the Board
had jurisdiction over his appeal, Perez argued that he fell within the
definition of "employee" 9' by way of his being a "veteran" and therefore
a preference eligible under Title 5.
Executive Order 12,754 established the Southwest Asia Service
Medal for military members who served in Southwest Asia, the
surrounding waters, or air space.93 A review of Perez's submitted
Department of Defense Form 21494 showed that he served on active duty
in the armed forces from February 2, 1991, to May 2, 1991, during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.95 Perez did not receive the
Southwest Asia Service Medal because he served his active duty time in
Germany in support of the operations and not in the Persian Gulf
96region. The court in Perez interpreted the definition of "veteran" in
87. The Merit Systems Protection Board was created to hear appeals of adverse
personnel actions that are brought by employees or applicants for employment. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7701 (2000).
88. 85 F.3d 591 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
89. Allowing a "veteran" to appeal a removal from a civil service position likely
does not further the purpose of easing the transition from military to civilian life, but
these cases stand for the premise that the subjects of the cases should have been
considered "veterans" based on their service and sacrifices to the country.
90. Perez, 85 F.3d at 592.
91. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2000) (defining "employee" as a preference
eligible who has completed one year of continuous service in the United States Postal
Service). In Perez, it was undisputed that Perez had completed the time requirements for
appealing his removal and that being removed from his position was an adverse
personnel action. Perez, 83 F.3d at 592-93.
92. Perez, 83 F.3d at 593.
93. Exec. Order No. 12,754; 56 Fed. Reg. 11,055 (Mar. 12, 1991); 1991 WL
11253645.
94. Section 12 of a Department of Defense Form 214 lists the date entered and
separated from active duty as well as all other relevant dates concerning a military
member's active duty service. Department of Defense Form 214, Certificate of Release
or Discharge from Active Duty, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/
pdf/i 13361wch3_010689/il 3361 p.pdf (last visited July 27, 2005).
95. Perez, 83 F.3d at 593.
96. Id. at 593.
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Title 5 to exclude Perez because he did not receive the campaign medal
and because he never served "in" the designated geographic area.97 The
court thus determined that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear Perez's
appeal because Perez was not a "preference eligible" and not a "veteran"
in accordance with Title 5.98 Although Perez served in the armed forces
Reserves for twenty-two years and on active duty for three months in
support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, his service did not
make him eligible for preference because it did not meet the
requirements of Title 5.99
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1998,00 although it
came a few years too late for Perez, added the period from August 2,
1990, to January 2, 1992, to the time periods for which active duty
service would result in a member being considered a "veteran" under
Title 5.1°1 Thus, Perez would be considered a "veteran" and a
"preference eligible" under the current definition.
Former military members who served on active duty during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm that did not receive a
campaign medal were afforded "veteran" status in 1998 through the
National Defense Authorization Act, 10 2 but amending Title 5 by adding
the seventeen month period from August 1990 to January 1992 to the
definition of "veteran" is only a small step in the direction of fully
effectuating the purposes of veterans' preference law. 1
03
In Shaddi v. Merit Systems Protection Board,1°4 the court
determined that even if Shaddi had submitted his Department of Defense
Form 214 to the Board, his service still would not have given him
"veteran" status.105 Shaddi served on active duty from July 1979 to July
1984.106 Similar to Perez, because his service was not during a war, in a
campaign or expedition for which a campaign medal was authorized, or
during a certain time period as specified by statute, 10 7 Shaddi's five years
of active duty service to the country did not qualify him as a "veteran"
under Title 5.108 It is extremely unlikely that Congress will amend Title
5 to include service from 1979 to 1984 as qualifying service.
97. Id. at 594.
98. Id. at 594-95.
99. Id. at 594.
100. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-340 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2251
[hereinafter National Defense Authorization Act].
101. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1)(C).
102. National Defense Authorization Act, supra note 100, at 304.
103. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
104. 102 Fed.Appx. 698 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
105. Id. at 699.
106. Id.
107. Perez, 85 F.3d at 594; 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1)(A)-(C).
108. Shaddi, 102 Fed.Appx. at 699.
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Evaluating Perez's and Shaddi's military service in light of Title 5
and the long-standing, traditional justifications for veterans' preference
as stated in Feeney, °9 one can conclude that their service was not a
sacrifice for which they should be rewarded and that civil service
organizations would prefer more disciplined individuals than Perez and
Shaddi.
D. The Proposed Changes
This Comment is not intended to place veterans who did not serve
in combat and who do not have a service-connected disability on equal-
footing with veterans whose service does include such characteristics.
What is proposed is that Title 5 should be amended to recognize that all
veterans, regardless of the dichotomy between whether the service was
during wartime or peacetime, must be afforded the preference in order to
fully effectuate the historical purposes of veterans' preference.
As evidenced by Perez and Shaddi, Title 5 denies preference to
veterans who voluntarily enlist in the armed forces to defend our
freedom unless they find themselves in combat or with a disability.1 °
When a person volunteers to serve in the armed forces he or she swears
to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic."11' At any time throughout their
enlistment, military members may be sent into combat, or in the case of
National Guard and Reserve members, activated and sent into combat.
112
Military personnel thus support and defend our Constitution twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, without regard to
whether our country is at war.
Military members have no influence over whether our country goes
to war, but if such a member is ordered to deploy in response to
hostilities, the member has no option of declining such an order." 13 Such
109. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 99, 108 and accompanying text.
111. 10 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
112. Id. § 12301. The statute provides that
"[i]n time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress, or
when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the
Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons affected,
order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to
serve as a unit, of a reserve component under the jurisdiction of that
Secretary to active duty for the duration of the war or emergency and
for six months thereafter."
Id.
113. Id. § 892 (providing that any military member subject to the jurisdiction of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice is derelict in the performance of his or her duties by
failing to obey a lawful order).
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a declination would most likely result in a court-martial.'
1 4
Title 5's "all or nothing" approach to providing preference is
beyond the control of service members because those who join the armed
forces can in no way guarantee that their service will afford them
"veteran" status under Title 5. 15 Not knowing whether or not one will
attain "veteran" status most likely does not encourage patriotic service."
6
In recognition that all members of the armed forces make sacrifices
for our freedom, the definition of "veteran" in Title 5 should be amended
to include all servicemen and servicewomen who honorably served in the
armed forces. Making this change is the only way to fully effectuate the
historical and traditional purposes of veterans' preference as stated in
Feeney. 117
If such amendment is made, Title 5's additional point provision
would need to be amended as well.1 18 Disabled veterans and preference
eligibles who are afforded preference as the result of being the spouse or
mother of a deceased or disabled veteran should continue to receive ten
points added to their passing civil service examination scores. 19 All
other veterans whose service meets the current Title 5 definition of
"veteran" by virtue of service during war, in a campaign for which a
campaign medal was authorized, or during the dates identified, should
receive ten additional points on their passing examination scores instead
of five points.' 20 Finally, five points should be added to the passing civil
service examination scores of any other veteran who would have been
otherwise precluded from receiving preference under the current
definition. These changes would provide preference for all veterans,
while still recognizing the increased sacrifices made by disabled veterans
and veterans who served in war or combat.
IV. Pennsylvania's "Soldier": A Step in the Right Direction
A. Pennsylvania Preference v. Title 5
Pennsylvania's veterans' preference laws, like the federal veterans'
preference laws, were enacted after the Civil War.' 21 Although the
114. Id.
115. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
118. 5 U.S.C. § 3309 (2000).
119. Id. §§ 2108(3)(C)-(G), 3309(1).
120. Id. § 2108(1). Currently, these veterans are only provided with five additional
points on their passing civil service examinations scores. Id. § 3309(2).
121. See Preferential Treatment of War Veterans, No. 2, 38 Pa. D. & C. 129, 131
(1940) (stating that the Act of May 19, 1887, provided preference in appointments for
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preference is located within the Commonwealth's Military and Veterans
Code' 2 and not the Civil Service Act, 23 the Pennsylvania State Civil
Service Commission ("the Commission") is the agency responsible for
administering and implementing the preference for the agencies under
the Commission's jurisdiction.
2 4
Similar to Title 5, the Pennsylvania veterans' preference laws
provide for additional points to be added to a veteran's passing civil
service examination score, 25 preference in appointment, 26 and limited
preference in certain furlough and reduction in force cases.1
27
Unlike Title 5, Pennsylvania adds ten points to all veterans' passing
examination scores and does not distinguish between disabled and non-
disabled veterans. 28 The preference does not mandate the placement of
honorably discharged Union veterans of the Civil War in all departments of the
Commonwealth as long as the veteran was qualified for the employment position); see
also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
122. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101 et seq. Specifically, the veterans' preference
provisions are located in Part V of Title 51 and titled Employment Preferences and
Pensions. Id. §§ 7101-09.
123. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 741.1 etseq. (West 1990).
124. Hous. Auth. of the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Serv. Comm'n,
730 A.2d 935, 943 (Pa. 1999). The Civil Service Act charges the Pennsylvania State
Civil Service Commission with establishing conditions that attract qualified persons of
"character" and "ability" to civil service employment. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 741.2.
Through promulgation of Management Directive 580.21, which applies the preference
afforded to veterans in the Military and Veterans Code to the civil service examination
process, the Commission furthered the intent of the legislature in providing veterans with
preference because of the belief that military experience is unique and should thus be
taken into account when determining an applicant's "character" and "ability." County of
Chester, 730 A.2d at 943; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor's Office,
Management Directive 580.21-Veterans' Preference on Classified Service Employment
Lists (June 5, 1997), http://www.oa.state.pa.us/oac/cwp/ view.asp?A=12&Q=130672 (last
visited July 27, 2005) [hereinafter Management Directive]. The Management Directive
has not yet been amended to reflect the changes set forth in Act 195.
125. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7103.
126. Id. § 7104.
127. Id. § 7107.
128. Id. § 7103(a). The Military and Veterans Code applies to all Commonwealth
agencies and all political subdivisions, including all municipal civil service positions. Id.
§ 7109. The "point" provision that applies to examinations for municipal employment
positions differs from the way the provision is applied to examinations administered by
the Commission for Commonwealth employment positions. Id. § 7103(b). For example,
on municipal examinations, instead of ten points being added to a veteran's passing
examination score, a veteran's exam is graded 15% perfect. Id. Although the Military
and Veterans Code states that a veteran's examination "shall be marked or graded 15%
perfect before the quality or contents of the examination shall be considered," this was
held unconstitutional. Id. (emphasis added); Commw. ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 3 A.2d
701 (Pa. 1939). It is first required for the veteran to actually pass the examination in
order to receive the 15% perfect point augmentation. Veterans' Preference in Public
Employment-Hiring-Promotions, 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-17, 56 (Jun. 15, 1976).
Hypothetically, this means that if a veteran receives a score of 100 out of a total possible
score of 100, the veteran would have a final grade or classification of 115.
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veterans at the top of employment lists of eligible candidates, but if a
veteran is one of the top three candidates, then the veteran must be
appointed to the position. 129 Besides mandating that an agency hire a
veteran that is ranked in the top three, agencies are allowed to disregard
the Rule of Three to appoint a lower-ranked applicant if the applicant is
also a veteran. 130 This means that an agency can hire any veteran that
has a passing examination score from an employment list regardless of
whether the veteran is the lowest-ranked person on the list.
131
In addition, unlike Title 5, Pennsylvania does not provide veterans
with a mandatory preference in promotions. 132 In Housing Authority of
the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission,
133
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished between the preference in
appointments and the preference in promotions, explaining why
preference in the promotional context was violative of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.1 34 The court explained that when candidates for promotion
compete with one another for a position, they are on equal footing
because they each have had the opportunity to develop their skills in the
same environment.1 35 Thus, if one candidate is less skilled than his or
her counterpart, former military service should not account for this
shortcoming; 136 however, when candidates seek appointment to a
position for which neither have experience, the candidate with military
experience rationally can be viewed as the superior candidate.
37
The addition of ten points to a veteran's passing examination score
and the absolute hiring preference when a veteran is one of the top three
eligible candidates makes Pennsylvania's veterans' preference law one of
the most generous in the country.
1 38
129. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104(b); Management Directive, supra note 124, at
§ (a)(2). Like the federal Rule of Three, Commonwealth agencies must hire one of the
three top-ranked candidates. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 741.601.
130. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104(c). An agency can only disregard the Rule of
Three to hire a lower-ranked veteran if the veteran passed the examination and possesses
the requisite qualifications. Id.
131. Id.
132. Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 83 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1951) (holding that
providing preference to veterans on promotional examinations was unconstitutional); see
also Hoffman v. Township of Whitehall, 677 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Pa. 1996) (holding that,
although the provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution that had previously been relied
upon in O'Neill had been revised, such revisions did not make O'Neill invalid, thus
preference in the promotional context was still unconstitutional).
133. 730 A.2d 935 (Pa. 1999).




138. Commonwealth of Pa. Legislative Budget and Finance Comm., Review of the
Effectiveness of the Civil Service System in County Government Pursuant to Senate
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B. Who is a "Soldier"?
In order for a veteran of the armed forces to receive preference in
Pennsylvania, the veteran's service must meet the requirements set forth
in the definition of "soldier" in the Military and Veterans Code.' 39 Until
recently, "soldier" was defined as any person who was honorably
discharged 140 from the armed forces of the United States after serving
during any war or armed conflict, or who served or hereafter serves since
July 27, 1953.141 Service prior to July 27, 1953, must have been during
specified periods of time for the service to qualify a veteran as a
"soldier" and thus eligible for preference. 42 Thus, unlike Title 5, the
Pennsylvania definition of "soldier" affords preference to all veterans
who served since July 27, 1953, regardless of whether the service was
during war or in a campaign or expedition.
143
Another distinction between the definition of "veteran" in Title 5
and Pennsylvania's definition of "soldier" is the absence of the phrase
"served on active duty" in Pennsylvania's "soldier" definition. 144
Instead, the definition of "soldier" includes the phrase "served or
hereafter serves in the armed forces.' 45  This is significant because
Pennsylvania affords veterans' preference to National Guard and Reserve
members who would otherwise not receive such preference under federal
law because of the "served on active duty" language. 146  Thus,
Resolution 171, at S-7 (Sep. 2004); Commonwealth of Pa. Legislative Budget and
Finance Comm., Study on Civil Service Reform Pursuant to Senate Resolution 1997-14,
at S-8 (Apr. 1998).
139. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7101.
140. Id. The Department of Defense Form 214 does not have to specifically identify
a veteran's discharge as "honorable" in order to be classified as a "soldier," but the
discharge must be under "honorable conditions" which includes, but is not limited to, a
"general discharge, good discharge, satisfactory discharge, indifferent discharge or
special order discharge." Veterans' Preference-Honorable Discharge as Condition
Precedent to-Analysis of Types of Discharge, 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 35, 159 (Dec. 2,
1957). A veteran whose Department of Defense Form 214 characterizes his or her
discharge as a "dishonorable discharge, bad conduct discharge, undesirable discharge, a
dismissal, or any other type of separation certificate given under conditions other than
honorable" is not classified as a "soldier" under Pennsylvania's preference law. Id.
Although this opinion, like all opinions of the Attorney General, is not binding on any
court, courts customarily afford such opinions great weight and deference. McDowell v.
Good Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 154 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. 1959).
141. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7101 (West 1976).
142. Management Directive, supra note 124, at 2 (stating that the qualifying periods
of time are from April 6, 1917, through July 2, 1921, from December 7, 1941, through
September 2, 1945, and from June 25, 1950, through July 27, 1953).
143. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7101.
144. Compare 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7101 (West 1976), with 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1)
(2000).
145. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7101.
146. Herskovitz v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 534 A.2d 160, 162-63 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
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Pennsylvania provides National Guard and Reserve members with
preference even if they are never called to serve in an active duty
capacity.
Applying Pennsylvania's definition of "soldier" instead of "veteran"
to the service of the veterans in Perez and Shaddi would result in curing
those injustices. Although the veteran in Perez served only three months
of active duty during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, he had
also served in the armed forces Reserves for twenty-two years.1 47 The
veteran in Shaddi served on active duty for five consecutive years, but
his service was not during a war or in a campaign or expedition for
which a medal was authorized.14 8  Both of these veterans would be
considered a "soldier" if they applied for a civil service position in
Pennsylvania.
49
C. The New "Soldier": Act 195 of 2004
Pennsylvania currently has 7,569 Army National Guard and
Reserve members activated or deployed in support of current worldwide
military operations.1 50  This number ranks third in the nation behind
California and Texas. 151 Recognizing the need for a change in current
veterans' preference law to correct the deficiencies created by the old
definition of "soldier," the Pennsylvania legislature amended the
definition of "soldier" on November 30, 2004, by enacting Act 195 of
2004 ("Act 195").152
In Herskovitz v. State Civil Service Commission, the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania interpreted the definition of
1987) (stating that the Military and Veterans Code does not have to conform with and be
interpreted as part of federal veterans' preference law). Under Title 5, National Guard
and Reserve members are afforded "veteran" status only if they are called to active duty,
other than for training, during a war or armed conflict for which a medal has been
authorized, or during the specified dates as identified by Congress. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1).
However, a National Guard or Reserve member had to have been activated for a
minimum of 180 consecutive days if the service was from January 31, 1955, to October
15, 1976. Id.
147. Perez, 83 F.3d at 594-95; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
148. Shaddi, 102 Fed.Appx. at 698; see also supra notes 101-103 and accompanying
text.
149. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7101. Both Perez and Shaddi would be considered a
"soldier" because both were honorably discharged from the armed forces and served
since July 27, 1953. Id.
150. See Department of Defense, National Guard and Reserve Units Called to Active
Duty (Jan. 5, 2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2005/d20050511 ngr.pdf (last
visited July 27, 2005).
151. Id. (California currently has 9,590 Army National Guard and Reserve members
activated or deployed in support of current worldwide military operations, and Texas
currently has 9,451).
152. Act 195, supra note 9.
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"soldier" to include National Guard and Reserve members. 53 However,
in Sicuro v. City of Pittsburgh,154 the court limited the preference as it
applied to National Guard and Reserve members by requiring that such
members complete their initial service commitment in order to receive
veterans' preference.155 The court reasoned that extending Herskovitz by
interpreting the definition of "soldier" to qualify a National Guard or
Reserve member for preference after only completion of initial training
would diminish the opportunities for veterans who have actually
completed their full service to the military.
5 6
Act 195 now does what the Sicuro court declined to do, that is,
expand Herskovitz.157 Under the new law, National Guard and Reserve
members who are called to active duty and subsequently released back to
their National Guard or Reserve units are eligible for preference although
such members may not have completed their total commitment to the
military. 58 Thus, National Guard and Reserve members who are never
activated must still complete their initial commitment to the military in
order to be considered a "soldier" and receive preference.1 59
D. Act 195's Application
Act 195 "corrects the inequity in interpretation of the current law"
by recognizing that many National Guard and Reserve members return
153. 534 A.2dat 163.
154. 684 A.2d 232 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). See generally John W. Lasky, Military
Affairs-Veterans' Preference Act-Statutory Construction-The Commonwealth Court
Of Pennsylvania Held That Honorably Discharged Veterans Of The United States
Reserves Or National Guard Are Eligible For Employment Preference In Public
Positions Only When They Fulfill Their Complete Military Obligations, 36 DuQ. L. REv.
671 (1998) (discussing the Sicuro holding and its effect on then existing veterans'
preference law).
155. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 237.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
158. Act 195, supra note 9. The language that a "soldier" is a person "who was
released from active duty under honorable conditions" is meant to apply specifically to
National Guard and Reserve members because only they are "released" from active duty.
Id. (emphasis added).
159. Id. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has recently held that the Sicuro
language requiring the completion of a military service commitment before receiving
preference was only dictum. Soberick v. Salisbury Township Civil Serv. Comm'n, 874
A.2d 155 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). The court held that a Reservist who served over
eleven months of active duty after September 11, 2001, was a "soldier" and eligible for
preference. Id. at 158-59. However, the court cited the Act 195 definition of "soldier" to
reach this result, instead of the pre-amendment definition, even though the preference
was denied in 2003, prior to the amendment. Id. at 158. Under Act 195, the Reservist in
Soberick is a "soldier" without having to reference Sicuro. Thus, even after Soberick and
Act 195, Sicuro still should remain applicable to National Guard and Reserve members
who are never required to serve on active duty.
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from overseas combat zones and remain in the National Guard and
Reserves. 160 Since such members are released from active duty and not
discharged from their units, they would not have been eligible for
preference under the old "soldier" definition.
16 1
The Pennsylvania Department of Military and Veterans Affairs,
responsible for designating qualifying periods of service for purposes of
Act 195, has selected August 2, 1990, as the beginning date of the
qualifying period. 62 This date was selected as a practical matter in order
to encompass every National Guard and Reserve member who could
have been released from active duty since the Gulf War, since such
members may still be serving their commitments. 1
63
The sacrifices of many Pennsylvania National Guard and Reserve
members who are deployed or activated to defend our country will only
be rewarded by Pennsylvania, and not by the federal government.
164
Although some members may be in a geographic location designated as a
campaign or an expedition for which they may receive a medal, thus
qualifying them as a "veteran," there will be a large proportion of them
that might not fall within the Title 5 definition. Unless Congress passes
legislation similar to the National Defense Authorization Act, 65 a
military member currently deployed in Germany in a support role may
not receive any preference. 166  Additionally, an active duty military
member who was not deployed, but remained stateside, may not receive
any preference when he or she leaves the military.167  These are not
hypothetical scenarios, but actual injustices, as evidenced by Perez and
Shaddi.1
68
160. Memorandum from Jessica L. Wright, Major General, Adjutant General of
Pennsylvania, to Ronald K. Rowe, Executive Director, Pennsylvania State Civil Service
Commission (Dec. 29, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter General's Memo].
161. Id.; see also supra note 158 and accompanying text.
162. General's Memo, supra note 160, at 2.
163. Id.
164. This is subject to the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006 that proposed an amendment to the definition of "veteran" in Title 5
which would essentially afford preference to all current active duty members. See supra
note 66 and accompanying text. However, this amendment would not cover the service
of anyone currently deployed who does not serve the required 180 consecutive days of
active duty prior to the last date of Operation Iraqi Freedom, or anyone who serves after
such date. Although the proposed amendment is a step in the right direction, it still does
not fully effectuate the purposes of veterans' preference.
165. National Defense Authorization Act, supra note 100.
166. See, e.g., Perez v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 85 F.3d 591, 594 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
167. See, e.g., Shaddi v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 102 Fed.Appx. 698 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
168. See supra notes 87-109 and accompanying text.
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E. Rewarding Sacrifice!
Unlike Congress, the Pennsylvania legislature actually codified its
reasoning for providing veterans with preference in civil service
employment. Specifically, the Military and Veterans Code provides that
veterans are given preference because of the discipline and experience
attained from military training1 69 and for the "loyalty and public spirit"
that servicemen and servicewomen exhibit and demonstrate by serving
their country.1
70
The Pennsylvania courts have also recognized the historical
purposes of veterans' preference by noting that the preference is a reward
for service to the country. 171  More importantly, the courts have
recognized that any person who serves in the armed forces exhibits
loyalty and public spirit and attains discipline and experience.17 2 Such is
true for military members who served during peacetime as much as it is
true for those who served during war or conflict. 173 This is in contrast to
Title 5 which affords the preference to only veterans who served during
war or conflict unless that service happened to have fallen within a
certain time period.
In Soberick, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania summed up
the importance of veterans' preference by stating:
The preference ... is not only a reward to an individual. It is also a
formal recognition of the value of intangible qualities developed
during significant military service. By the preference our General
Assembly attracts the valuable qualities of discipline, experience,
loyalty and public spirit to civil public service. Thus, awarding the
preference ... benefits the public.
174
If the Pennsylvania legislature recognizes and rewards the unique
sacrifices or our National Guard and Reserve members, then Congress
can too. Both Pennsylvania and the federal government have historically
offered preference to veterans as a reward for their sacrifices and because
of the discipline attained from military service. 7' However, the federal
government falls short of fully effectuating those purposes by limiting
preference to only veterans who meet specified service requirements as
currently set forth in Title 5.
169. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (West 1976).
170. Id.
171. Sicuro v. City of Pittsburgh, 684 A.2d 232, 236 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
172. Pontious v. Rippy, 589 A.2d 1188, 1190 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
173. Id.
174. 874 A.2d 155 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).




Providing veterans with preference in civil service employment has
historically been a way to reward members of the armed forces for their
sacrifices in defense of our nation. 176 Besides rewarding veterans for
their military service, the preference has been recognized as a way to
ease the transition back to civilian life, 177 to encourage military
service, 178 and to attract well-disciplined people to civil service
employment.179  Notwithstanding these historic purposes, the current
definition of "veteran" in Title 5 does not recognize the sacrifices of all
servicemen and servicewomen. Instead, Title 5 rewards only those
military members whose service meets its stringent criteria, while
ignoring those that do not.180  To fully effectuate the purposes of
veterans' preference, the sacrifices of all military members must be
recognized.
In light of the increased use of National Guard and Reserve
members for worldwide military operations,' 8 ' the federal government
should take notice of Pennsylvania's veterans' preference system and the
recently amended definition of "soldier." Forcing National Guard and
Reserve members who may have served an extensive period of time on
active duty as the result of a military call-up to wait until they have
completed their initial service commitment before they can receive
preference is unreasonable. The federal government should afford
preference to such members who are released from active duty service
but who have not yet completed their military service commitment.
Veterans' preference is a concept that has been so pervasive in
American society that the justifications for affording it have become
standardized. 8 2 With the increased need for military personnel and the
unpredictable nature of current and future worldwide conflicts, this long-
standing tradition must not falter at a time when it appears we need it
most.





180. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1).
181. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
182. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 265; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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